Workplace Unionism, Collective Bargaining and Skill Formation: New Results from Mixed Methods by Berton, Fabio et al.
DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES





Workplace Unionism, Collective 
Bargaining and Skill Formation: New 
Results from Mixed Methods
OCTOBER 2019
Any opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in this series may 
include views on policy, but IZA takes no institutional policy positions. The IZA research network is committed to the IZA 
Guiding Principles of Research Integrity.
The IZA Institute of Labor Economics is an independent economic research institute that conducts research in labor economics 
and offers evidence-based policy advice on labor market issues. Supported by the Deutsche Post Foundation, IZA runs the 
world’s largest network of economists, whose research aims to provide answers to the global labor market challenges of our 
time. Our key objective is to build bridges between academic research, policymakers and society.
IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper 





IZA – Institute of Labor Economics
DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES
ISSN: 2365-9793
IZA DP No. 12712
Workplace Unionism, Collective 
Bargaining and Skill Formation: New 
Results from Mixed Methods
OCTOBER 2019
Fabio Berton
University of Torino, IZA and LABORatorio 
R. Revelli
Anna Carreri
University of Verona and University of Has-
selt
Francesco Devicienti
University of Torino, Collegio Carlo Alberto, 




IZA DP No. 12712 OCTOBER 2019
Workplace Unionism, Collective 
Bargaining and Skill Formation: New 
Results from Mixed Methods1
Among the steps to improve a country’s competitiveness, several commentators and 
international institutions include a general emphasis on deregulation and decentralization 
of industrial relations. In this paper, we contribute to this debate by studying whether 
and how firm-level unionism and collective agreements affect workplace training, a key 
ingredient to competitiveness. Theory provides inconclusive predictions on the various 
channels and processes through which firm-level industrial relations may affect workplace 
training. Quantitative and qualitative analyses, when used in isolation, have also proved 
insufficient for an adequate account of the various factors at play. This is where our paper 
mostly contributes. In the spirit of opening the “black box” of firm-level unionism and 
collective bargaining, we mix together quantitative and qualitative strategies. Our results 
suggest that workplace unionism, and especially decentralized collective agreements, favor 
workplace training in subtler and often more dynamic ways than commonly understood. 
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Intangible assets such as human capital and industrial relations are important 
sources of economic growth. Knowledge supports long-run competitiveness (Dostie, 2018; 
European Commission, 2008; 2010; 2016; Quintini, 2014), and a significant part of the 
whole stock of skills and experience is acquired from vocational or on-the-job training 
(Cedefop, 2019a; 2019b). Workplace training, in turn, is often a matter regulated under 
collective agreements, both at the national and at the firm level, and is more generally 
affected by unions’ activity (Cooney and Stuart, 2012; Heyes and Stuart, 1998). Workers’ 
organizations, on the other hand, may also affect efficiency and competitiveness directly, 
either in negative (FitzRoy and Kraft, 1985; 1987; Oswald, 1985) or in positive ways 
(Freeman and Medoff, 1979; 1984; Rogers and Streeck, 1995; Tüselmann et al. 1987).  
Among the steps to improve a country’s competitiveness, several commentators 
and international institutions have increasingly included a general emphasis on 
deregulation and decentralization of industrial relations (e.g., OECD, 2015), seen however 
rather skeptically by other scholars (e.g., Eichenberger and Trampusch, 2012; Estevez-Abe 
et al., 2001). In this paper we aim at contributing to this debate by studying how firm-level 
industrial relations affect workplace training decisions in a country – Italy – that, starting 
in the 1990s, has progressively shifted its collective bargaining process from the 
central/sectoral level to the local/firm one, arriving in 2011 to introduce a law that allows 
firm-level decisions to opt out of national laws and of sectoral collective agreements.  
Firm-level union activity may affect workplace training in many ways, as we set up 
to review in the next section. In principle, different channels might be at play, some having 
positive while others having negative effects on firm-sponsored training programs. 
Generally speaking, one might expect an overall negative effect to prevail, whenever the 
opportunistic and conflictual behaviors often associated to the so-called “monopoly face” 
of unions are dominant. On the contrary, a positive impact of workplace unionism and 
collective bargaining is likely to emerge whenever the more collaborative and participative 
face, the so-called “collective voice” of unions, dominates (Freeman and Medoff, 1984). 
Theory alone is clearly insufficient to settle the issue; this is why we embark, in what 
follows, in a thorough empirical analysis.  
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We do so by combining two different empirical strategies. Our first strategy is based 
on econometric estimates of the relationship between workplace union activity and firm-
sponsored training. We rely on a firm-level survey providing a rich set of information on 
training activities, workplace unionism and firm characteristics. The data are longitudinal, 
enabling us to control for firm time-invariant unobserved characteristics via firm fixed 
effects. A noticeable feature of our data is that we have diverse measures of firm-sponsored 
training, ranging from the share of workers undergoing training to measures of the 
monetary cost of the training initiatives. The latter provides us with a measure of the quality 
of training, a type of information that is rarely available in other data sets (an example is 
Kriechel et al., 2014).    
While the econometric analysis provides strong evidence of a positive relationship 
between workplace union activity and firm-sponsored training, it is less well-equipped to 
provide an adequate account of the various mechanisms at play. This is why we rely on 
another, qualitative in nature, empirical strategy. Put it simply, if observational available 
data cannot provide us with a fuller account of the various processes that enable, or rather 
prevent, union activity to have an impact on firm training, why not ask directly to the people 
that are repeatedly involved in such processes to share with us their experiences?  
We believe that the combination of quantitative and qualitative analyses is where 
our paper mostly contributes to the literature, in the spirit of opening the “black box” 
(Beach, 2019) of firm-level union activity and collective bargaining. In this respect, a 
distinctive strength of our mixed-methods approach is that we can make progress in 
disentangling the effects of the presence of workplace unions per se from those arising 
upon the signing of a formal firm-level agreement. Indeed, the survey data used for the 
econometric analyses allow us to observe whether or not a union body with workers’ 
representatives has been set up at the firm level, and whether or not a firm-level agreement 
is in place at any survey year. Similarly, our qualitative analysis is aimed at unravelling, 
from the experiences of the key informants involved, the separate roles of firm-level 
collective bargaining from the more general effects arising out of workplace representation 
and union activity.        
Following Johnson et al. (2007: 123), “mixed methods research is the type of 
research in which a researcher or team of researchers combines elements of qualitative 
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and quantitative research approaches (e.g., use of qualitative and quantitative viewpoints, 
data collection, analysis, inference techniques) for the broad purpose of breadth and depth 
of understanding and corroboration”. More specifically, we apply a sequential research 
design. First, the application of state-of-the-art econometric techniques to a large 
representative sample of Italian companies surveyed over time through an extremely 
detailed questionnaire, suggests that the existence of a firm-based collective agreement 
enhances the probability that a worker receives workplace training and makes the per-
worker and per-trainee expenditure on training grow. Second, thematic qualitative analyses 
of twenty-five semi-structured interviews to key informants of industrial relations, training 
programs and hiring strategies, allows us to identify key dimensions of the relationship 
between workplace unionism, collective bargaining and skill formation, and the underlying 
processes. Our joint reading of the quantitative and qualitative analyses suggests that 
workplace unionism, and especially decentralized collective agreements, favors workplace 
training in subtler, often more dynamic, ways than commonly understood, and highlights 
a number of hitherto understated policy implications.  
Our paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we provide the reader with a conceptual 
framework and a literature review, followed in section 3 by a short account of Italy’s 
institutional background and the evolution of the rules governing its industrial relations. In 
section 4, we describe the data and our twofold empirical strategy. Section 5 comments the 
results of the quantitative analysis, while section 6 focuses on the finding of qualitative 
analysis. Section 7 offers a summary, joint reading of our mixed-methods analysis, and 
provides some concluding remarks. 
 
 
2. Conceptual framework and literature 
 
Union activity and collective bargaining at the firm level may have a bearing on the 
accumulation of human capital, with potential benefits for both workers and firms. Our 
paper focuses on the type of human capital accumulation that occurs via firm-level training 
initiatives, and hence for the most part specific to the firm where the training is offered.  
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The literature posits that workplace unionism and collective bargaining may have 
both positive and negative effects on the amount and quality of firm-sponsored training. A 
typical situation where the negative effects are more likely to manifest themselves is when 
workers’ representative, and the local unions’ officials often providing them with external 
support in workplace industrial relation issues, are rather oriented towards opportunistic, 
rent-capturing behaviors, as described by the hold-up literature.2 Whenever a firm’s 
investments in physical or human capital have a sizable “sunk cost” component, and 
contracts are incomplete (e.g., it is possible to renegotiate wages and other working 
conditions ex-post, at any time after the investment has taken place), a hold-up problem 
arises (Grout, 1984). In this case, the firm invests sub-optimally, or may even completely 
give up the initial investment plans, if it anticipates that a monopolist union may, through 
higher future wage claims, capture the returns of the investment being contemplated today 
(Card et al., 2014; Cardullo et al., 2015; Cavanaugh, 1998; Hirsch, 1991). More generally, 
workplace unionism may exert a negative impact on the quantity and quality of firm-
sponsored training whenever conflictual behaviors are prevalent within the firm, with the 
consequence of reducing the resources (including the financial ones) available for the 
training investment.  
However, there are also various channels through which workers’ representatives 
and unions active at the workplace may have a positive impact on firm-sponsored training 
programs. First, workers’ representatives, possibly assisted by local unions, may provide 
valuable information on skill gaps and mismatches and on adequate interventions, as also 
suggested by the literature emphasizing the so-called “collective voice face” of unionism 
(Freeman and Medoff, 1984; McGuinnes and Ortiz, 2016).  
Second, union activity at the firm may promote long-term employment 
relationships (Boockmann and Steffes, 2010; Busemayer and Trampusch, 2012; Estevez-
Abe et al., 2001; Hirsch et al., 2010; Pfeifer, 2011) and bolster the integrity of internal labor 
markets (Harcourt and Wood, 2007), thus creating incentives for long-run human capital 
investments (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999; Lazear, 2009). Both the worker and the firm 
                                                 
2 Rents may emerge for a number of reasons, including monopsonistic labor markets (Manning, 2006), labor 
market frictions (Diamond, 1982a; 1982b; Mortensen, 1970; Pissarides, 1985) and also non-competitive 
markets for goods. 
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are more likely to invest in firm-specific human capital when the employment relation is 
expected to be long-lasting. By providing them with a “collective voice”, unions typically 
reduce the exercise of the “exit” option by dissatisfied workers. Collaborative workplace 
unions may also contribute to a positive corporate climate, and to the firm’s business 
longevity.3 Both mechanisms contribute to extend the time horizon of the employment 
relations and the willingness of firms and workers to accumulate specific human capital.  
Third, and relatedly, a positive effect is also to be expected if unions aim at defining 
an ex-ante “fair” contractual division between labor and capital (“rent-sharing”) of the 
future returns of the investment in human capital. In other words, workplace unionism may 
prevent a hold-up problem to arise from the worker’s perspective (Hashimoto, 1981). The 
hold-up refers here to the worker being reluctant to invest in firm-specific human capital 
fearing that the returns of her investment might be, partly o even entirely, captured by the 
firm. As stated by Parent (2004: 38), “by writing a contract in which it is specified that 
workers get a certain percentage of profits, workers can feel more confident that they will 
not be held up ex post”. In this case is not just the presence of workplace unions per se, but 
rather their ability to write binding contracts, e.g., via firm-level collective agreements, that 
matters for the neutralization of the hold-up problem.   
Forth, the payment of wage bonuses – typically regulated by firm-level agreements 
– may be an incentive device to promote efficiency in the production process (Katz and 
Ziderman, 1990; Leuven, 2005), while other non-wage dispositions set by firm-level 
agreements may prevent unions’ opportunistic behaviors and other actions that limit 
workplace flexibility, ultimately freeing resources to “invest into the future” (Devicienti et 
al., 2017; Green and Heywood, 2011). More generally, firm-level agreements can 
constitute a credible instrument to promote and implement "virtuous exchanges” between 
workers and the firm, with todays’ sacrifices (in terms of wages, working time, labor 
organization) being compensated by higher investments for the future. 
Firm-level collective bargaining is of course only one of the modalities through 
which workplace union activity may have an impact on a firm’s choices, including those 
                                                 
3 Addison et al. (2004) however point to a positive relationship between the presence of works councils and 
the probability of plant closures in Germany, in line with the effects of Australian unions reported in Brown 
and Heywood (2006).  
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related to training. We may think that it constitutes the formal tool, in the sense that it is 
typically necessary to “sit at the negotiating table”, present a union platform, bargain over 
it and, finally, sign a legal contract. Other modalities are represented by all forms of 
collaboration, participation and involvement, often at an informal level (e.g., meetings, 
assemblies and other daily exchanges between the management and the workers or their 
representatives), as well as all other actions that directly or indirectly create a “corporate 
climate” conducive to investments in (human) capital.4  
When the firm and the union jointly discuss and bargain over the various aspects of 
the employment relation, the negative implications related to the “monopoly face” of 
unions are more likely to be contained. In this respect, one may argue that the presence of 
a firm-level labor contract has a double significance. On the one hand, it signals that the 
“voice” option has been formally expressed by workers, reducing conflicts, increasing trust 
and cooperation among the counterparts, and possibly contributing to an overall better 
working environment. On the other hand, the signing of a firm-level agreement commits 
the union to a predetermined set of contractual rules on wage and labor organization 
aspects, reducing uncertainty and unions’ ex-post opportunistic behavior. Overall, one may 
expect that training opportunities within the firm are enhanced by the workplace union’s 
engagement in the processes and outcomes of collective bargaining. Keeping separate the 
mere presence of workplace representation and unions, on the one hand, and the signing of 
a formal firm-level agreement, on the other, is therefore important for a fuller 
understanding of the various factors at play, as discussed above, and is a distinctive feature 
of our analysis.5   
We finally turn to the available empirical literature and notice two aspects. First, 
most of the papers on the effects of workplace unions on training refer to the experiences 
of the German works councils. The reported effects are generally positive on training 
incidence and intensity (Stegmaier, 2012), on financing (Kriechel et al., 2014) and on 
participation (Allaart et al., 2009; Bellmann et al., 2018). There are also a few papers 
                                                 
4 In addition, the presence of a firm-level agreement implies responsibilities also on the employer’s side, and 
not only from workers’ representatives. 
5 In order to sign a firm-level agreement in Italy, the presence of workplace unions (RSA or RSU) is de facto 
necessary, although not sufficient, in case the bargaining process, for instance, does not result in any 
agreement, or the workers’ representatives are not interested (or strong, or wise enough) to start a bargaining 
process.    
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reporting positive effects for UK workplace unions (Booth et al., 2003; Green, 1993; Green 
et al., 1999). Outside these countries, the empirical literature is quite scant. Second, only 
very few contributions disentangle the separate effects of workplace unionism and firm-
level collective bargaining. Kriechel et al. (2014), who report of a positive interaction 
between works councils and collective bargaining on training, is one of the few examples 
that we are aware of. Our paper intends to contribute on both aspects.  
 
 
3. Institutional background 
 
Since the early nineties the country’s fairly centralized system of industrial relations have 
seen a gradual, if slow, process towards decentralization of collective bargaining, 
increasing over time the scope for firm-level agreements to derogate with respect to the 
dispositions set by sector-wide collective bargaining. The main changes were set in 2007 
and 2011. In 2007, Law no. 247 ruled that performance pays were subject to a significantly 
lower tax rate. This created an incentive for workers and firms to sign decentralized, mostly 
firm-level, agreements to take advantage of the more favorable tax rate. A deeper change 
occurred in 2011, when Law no. 148 – at its article 8 – ruled that firm- and local-level 
collective agreements could derogate in peius to both the labor law and the national 
collective contracts, albeit only for non-wage related matters. In the political and economic 
turmoil following the sovereign debt crisis, Law no. 148/2011 was conceived by the 
Berlusconi government as an attempt to fulfill the request of major labor market reforms – 
and more precisely of a harsh reduction of the Italian employment protection legislation – 
included in the well-known letter to Italy signed by the incumbent and prospective 
governors of the European Central Bank (Draghi and Trichet, 2011). While Law no. 
148/2011 was deemed insufficient to that purpose (Sacchi, 2015), it nonetheless introduced 
in Italy – at least formally – the possibility for employers to opt out from (national) 
collective agreements.6  
                                                 
6 In practice, according to data from the National Institute for the Evaluation of Public Policies (INAPP), for 
only less 3% of firms have made use of such opting-out in 2015.  
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Italy is therefore currently characterized by a two-tier bargaining system, with a 
dominant sectoral tier and a supplementary decentralized tier where bargaining is usually 
carried out at the company level.7 The main objectives of the sectoral agreements (National 
Collective Labor Agreements, NCLAs) are to protect real wages and to set common 
economic and normative conditions for sectoral workers nationwide. At the decentralized 
level, it is possible to negotiate performance and productivity-related wage increases. In 
addition, the second level bargaining may address a number of additional matters, such as 
working hours, employment, training, labor organization and union relations, in order to 
gain flexibility for organizational changes and competitiveness. Application to all workers 
in the firm of the conditions arrived at through bargaining at the decentralized level is the 
standard practice (Cella and Treu, 1999). Second-level bargaining is generally subject to 
the limits and provisions defined by the specific NCLAs applied in the productive unit.8  
Italian law gives the workers the right to join a union, engage in union activity and 
organize a plant-level union representation structure. The main workplace representation 
body is the so-called ‘unitary workplace union structures’ (Rappresentanze Sindacali 
Unitarie, RSU).9 The RSU includes features of works councils (e.g., worker 
representatives are elected by all employees) but can also be associated with trade union 
bodies (e.g., worker representatives are usually elected from competing candidates on trade 
unions lists).10 Hence, in Italy union and employee representation are entrusted to a single 
body (single-channel representation), as opposed to a dual-channel system where union 
                                                 
7 A territorial level (mostly at the province level) also exists, but is typically confined to particular industries, 
e.g., construction and agriculture.  
8 There are no official data on the diffusion and content of decentralized bargaining. Survey data suggest that 
the coverage is at around 60% of employees and from 15% to 25% of firms (Damiani and Ricci, 2014), with 
greater incidence in manufacturing and larger firms. A large fraction of second-level agreements (over 60%) 
contain wage increases related to productivity gains, but agreements dealing with workplace organizational 
changes, performance-based human resource management practices and employment flexibility are not 
uncommon, and broadly cover the remaining 40% of cases. 
9 According to Italian law, workers’ representation can be set up in firms with more than 15 employees, at the 
discretional initiative of workers. Hence, not all firms above 15 employees are unionized. Furthermore, the 
national bargaining system at the industry level can introduce workers’ representation also in firms with less 
than 15 employees. In our sample of firms with 10 to 15 employees, the share of unionized firms is around 
7%, while for firms above 15 employees it is at around 50%.  
10 Many features of Italian industrial relations are similar to those of other countries of continental Europe 
(see, e.g., Breda, 2015, for France, and OECD, 2004): a multi-tier bargaining; no US-style “certification 
elections” required for union recognition; workers can be represented by more than a union at the workplace; 
unions are open-shop. 
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delegates operate alongside works councils.11 Worker representatives are able to negotiate 
at the plant level on issues delegated from the industry-wide level, and have rights to 
information and consultation (D'Amuri and Giorgiantonio, 2015). According to CNEL 
(2007), issues related to the training of the workforce were covered from 38% (70%) to 
67% (88%) of company-level agreements in the period 1998-2004 in firms employing less 
(more) than 1,000 workers; another 33% (40%) to 78% (67%) were related to 
qualifications, albeit there is uncertainty about the exact content of the agreements and the 
data are not representative from a statistical standpoint. Union influence may also be 
exerted through more informal consultation and involvement practices. This channel is 
likely to be relevant at the productive-unit level between workers’ representatives and 
intermediate managers – especially in small-medium size firms – though little is known on 
the spread of such practices (Cerruti, 2011).  
 
 
4. Data and empirical strategy 
 
Our quantitative empirical analysis is based on the information provided by the Rilevazione 
su Imprese e Lavoro (RIL), a survey conducted by the Italian National Institute for the 
Analysis of Public Policies (INAPP) on a nationally representative survey of partnerships 
and limited liability companies operating in the non-agricultural private sector.12 The RIL 
survey has a panel structure, with waves occurring every four or five years. For our present 
purposes, we use the waves conducted in 2010 and 2015.  
RIL collects a rich set of information about management and corporate governance, 
personnel organization, industrial relations and other workplace characteristics. Mostly 
relevant to our purposes, the survey provides data on whether workers have established 
any form of workers’ representation at the workplace that is legally entitled to participate 
                                                 
11 There is also an alternative plant-level union body (Rappresentanza Sindacale Aziendale, RSA) elected by 
the members of a particular union. RSUs have tended to replace RSAs, which are usually found in smaller 
companies and in certain sectors like banking.  




in the firm-level bargaining process (Union, for short).13 Union is a binary indicator, which 
can be time-varying for any given firm. The survey also allows us to identify whether or 
not the firm has signed a firm-level agreement (FLA) with internal union representatives; 
𝐹𝐿𝐴 is a binary indicator, allowed to be time-varying at the level of the firm.14 Moreover, 
RIL includes extremely accurate measures of workplace training, ranging from the share 
of trainees on total employment to the cost of training and its funding source (whether 
internal to the firm or not). We also have information on other firm personnel policies (such 
as the use of fixed-term contracts, and the educational and age structure of the workforce), 
on the firm’s productive specialization and business strategies (e.g. innovation policies and 
export activities), as well as data about the education of the managers/entrepreneurs and 
the incidence of family ownership. These characteristics may play an important role in 
shaping both training policies and the nature of industrial relations at the workplace, thus 
reducing concerns related to omitted variable bias in our analysis.   
We focus our attention on firms with ten employees or more. Through this selection 
criterion, we seek to exclude self-employment (the rate of which in Italy is the highest in 
Europe) and firms whose employees are the owner’s household’s members. In addition, 
we expect this threshold to exclude firms with much unstructured recruitment and training 
policies. In order to drop outliers from the sample, we also exclude the top 0.5% of firms 
in terms of per-employee training expenditure. The resulting sample size is close to 4,000 
firms, observed twice over our survey rounds. 
On such sample, we apply two distinct estimation strategies. The first one, that can 
be considered a baseline, is a standard pooled OLS specification of the following type: 
 
𝑌𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝐿𝐴𝑗𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑋𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗𝑡   (1) 
 
                                                 
13 In accordance with the institutional framework presented in section 4, we take as an indicator of 
unionization the presence of either RSUs or RSAs at the workplace.  
14 A “union” is, in our quantitative analysis, the mere existence of a workplace body of workers’ 
representatives (RSU/RSA, see above). They are workers themselves, and not necessarily professionals of 
industrial relations or delegates of national-level unions, although strongly linked to the latter. Non-
workplace unions (e.g., regional or national bodies) keep constantly in touch with RSU/RSA, provide them 
with the needed know-how and support. Moreover, the non-workplace representatives often take part to the 
firm-level bargaining process. 
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where 𝑗 is the firm, 𝑡 = {2010, 2015} is the survey wave, 𝑌 stands for one of our five 
training measures: i) whether or not the firm is undergoing any training initiative at time 𝑡, 
ii) the share of trainees on firm’s total workforce, iii) whether the cost of training is funded 
by the firm, iv) (the log of) per-employee training cost and v) (the log of) per-trainee 
training cost.15 𝑋 is a set of (potentially time-varying) controls including workforce 
composition (share of women, of blue-collar workers, of temporary contracts, of young 
workers, of workers with a tertiary degree and of those with a secondary one), firm’s 
characteristics (manager’s or owner’s educational attainment, whether the firm is a family-
owned one, sales per capital, whether the firm sells at least part of its output abroad, net 
worker turnover, firm’s age, size and sector of activity), regional and year fixed effects.16 
The condition for the unbiased identification of the causal effects of interest (𝛽1 and 𝛽2) is 
that the idiosyncratic component 𝜀𝑗𝑡 is orthogonal to 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗𝑡 and 𝐹𝐿𝐴𝑗𝑡, conditional on 
𝑋𝑗𝑡. In order to make this identification condition less binding, we take advantage of the 
panel structure of the data and also estimate a firm fixed-effect (FE) model of the following 
type: 
 
𝑌𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝐿𝐴𝑗𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑋𝑗𝑡 + 𝜇𝑗 + 𝑒𝑗𝑡   (2) 
 
where 𝜇𝑗 captures a firm’s unobserved time-invariant characteristics (e.g., quality of the 
management and firm culture) that might correlate to both training activities and the 
propensity to set up a workplace union or sign a collective agreement. E.g., was 
management quality positively correlated with both 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗𝑡 and 𝑌𝑗𝑡, the parameter of 
interest 𝛽1 would be overestimated in model (1), but not in model (2). 
Table 1 provides some descriptive evidence. Workplace worker’s representation is 
present in around 20% of firms, while the share of firms with a decentralized agreement is 
at around 10%. Both variables appear to be rather stable during the sample period. The 
share of firms undergoing any training initiative is 44% in 2010, increasing to 58% five 
years later. All the measures of training intensity, with the exception of per-trainee 
                                                 
15 Non-training firms are assigned a 1-Euro expenditure on training and are thus kept in the estimation sample.   
16 Appendix C provides the details of the variables’ definitions. 
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expenditure, exhibit an increasing path. Namely, total expenditure grows from around 
€4,500 to more than €6,200 (+38%), while per-employee expenditure from €98.5 to €123.3 
(+25%) and the share of trainees passes from 23% to 39%. This seems to suggest that no 
relationship exists between training and decentralized bargaining. Our analyses, however, 
show that this is not the case.  
In spite of the quality of the survey data, and our ability to examine the separate 
role of union presence and firm-level collective bargaining, the resulting quantitative 
evidence has only a modest potential in terms of explanatory capacity. In other words, at 
best, we would know whether there is a causal relationship between firm-level unionism 
and bargaining and workplace training activities, with very limited knowledge on the 
underlying processes. This is why, in order to explain the quantitative findings and to go 
into more details in understanding the relationship between training, on the one hand, and 
workplace union and firm-level collective bargaining, on the other, we have adopted a 
sequential explanatory research design. Precisely, we have run twenty-five semi-structured 
interviews with key informants whose professional positions give them extensive and 
detailed knowledge about the processes through which unions intervene on workplace skill 
formation issues. The list of interviewees is heterogeneous and includes: seven union 
representatives from the three largest trade unions in Italy actively involved in 
decentralized collective bargaining; two representatives of the Italian employers' 
federation, who are actively involved in firm level bargaining; five human resource 
managers from companies with best practices in terms of training policy and industrial 
relations and where i) there is decentralized collective bargaining ii) there is a well-defined 
personnel selection policy; five people in charge of agencies which provide firms with 
continuing vocational training, also through the access to external resources via the fondi 
interprofessionali; three experts on skill mismatch and training; one person in charge of a 
private employment agency; one person in charge of a public employment center; one 
worker in charge of the training within his company. At the time of the interviews in 2016, 
they all operated in the secondary and tertiary sectors of a large Italian region, namely 
Veneto. To protect their privacy, we concealed company names and other identifying details 
in our analysis. 
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Interviews were carried out starting from the following topic areas, the 
comprehensiveness of which was designed in order to leave the largest freedom of 
discussion to the respondents: interviewee’s professional experience on skill mismatch 
both considering the analysis of skills gaps and the organization of (continuing) vocational 
training; firm-level collective bargaining and other channels through which trade union 
intervenes in workplace training; the actual processes and constraints on the involvement 
of trade unions in skill formation issues. Therefore, qualitative data were employed for 
complementary aspects of our investigation in order to understand the social processes at 
play and be more responsive to the needs of policy-makers.17 
The resulting interviews, which ranged from one to two hours, were audio recorded, 
fully transcribed and analyzed with the software for textual analysis Atlas.ti. A thematic 
qualitative analysis (Nowell et al., 2017), fit for the purpose of integrating quantitative 
results (Boyatzis, 1998) and identifying the existing patterns was conducted. Precisely, in 
a first stage, we used the interview questions to guide our analysis and outline a list of 
themes that made the analysis more targeted. However, since by using a predetermined 
thematic framework one loses in flexibility of analysis, and this can bias and limit the 
interpretation of the results, the list of themes of our qualitative analysis has been partly 
and inductively integrated in order to return the wealth of data and answer our research 
questions more in depth.  In this phase of open coding, eventually moving to axial coding, 
new themes, such as trade unions’ role in the bilateral funds system, were analyzed in their 
relation to the other categories. To ensure the reliability and consistency of the 
interpretative analytic work, the coded themes and their interrelations were discussed 
among the authors, and a continuous conversation between the emerging categories and 
theoretical interpretations was maintained. Moreover, we relied on the prolonged 
engagement (Lincoln and Guba, 1985) – from 2016 to 2018 – of one of the authors of the 
present contribution in the activity of post-monitoring of workplace training courses 
financed by bilateral funds within a parallel research project.  
 
                                                 
17 In combining quantitative (or variance-based) and qualitative (or case-based) methods, we follow Beach 
(2019) and avoid the option of using them jointly in order to identify the same causal links. Instead, we use 
the two methods to answer different questions: quantitative analysis in order to assess the existence of a link, 
and qualitative analysis to describe the channels underlying those links.  
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5. Empirical results: quantitative analysis 
 
Table 2 displays the estimation results from the OLS models in (1). They unambiguously 
suggest two main conclusions. First, we find that the presence of workplace unionism is 
associated to a higher probability – from 2.7 (share of trained workers) to 5.6 (probability 
of supplying training) percentage points – that workers undergo workplace training 
(columns 1 and 2). This also mirrors into higher measures of training quality, as the average 
training expenditure is also higher, both if computed as per-employee (+16.4%) and per-
trainee (+22.5%) cost (columns 3 and 4).  Second, the effect of firm-level bargaining is 
always higher than the mere presence of workplace unionism, with an estimated coefficient 
of FLA that is at least double than the corresponding coefficient for Union.18 This finding 
is in line with the discussion in section 2: when unions engage in firm-level contracting the 
positive effects associated to its “collective voice” are more likely to dominate the negative 
ones typical of its “monopoly face”. 
Table 3 displays the results of analogous models estimated via the fixed effect (FE) 
equation in (2). FE models allow us to control for firm unobserved heterogeneity. However, 
these models only rely on within-firm variation and are likely to exacerbate the attenuation 
bias arising from any measurement error in yearly classification of firms by FLA and Union 
status. As such, we treat the FE models as complementary, but not necessarily to be 
preferred, to the OLS evidence presented above. By and large, the main findings are 
confirmed also in Table 3. Both union presence and firm-level contracting have a positive 
impact on the quantity and quality of firm-level training. As expected, the estimated 
coefficients in columns 1-4 remain positive, but in most cases are smaller or not 
significantly different than in Table 2: e.g., the point estimate of FLA on the probability to 
supply training (share of trained workers) decreases from +10 (+7.2) p.p. to +8.1 (2.7) p.p., 
while that on per-worker (per-trainee) cost of training from +66.3% (71.8%) to +56.4% 
(74.4%, but the difference is not significant). This may derive from a combination of 
attenuation bias and from the effect of firm unobserved heterogeneity, like innovative 
managerial practices and firm productivity, which are expected to be positively associated 
                                                 




to workplace union and bargaining activities, on the one hand, and to a company’s 
propensity to train, on the other. Indeed, that there exist a “type” of management that favors 
workplace training and with which is easier to sign a collective agreement is a view finding 
support in our qualitative analysis in the next section.  
Table 3 further confirms the important finding that it is firm-level contracting, rather 
the workplace unionism per se, that is associated to higher training. Indeed, the higher 
standard errors of the FE models make all the estimated coefficients of Union statistically 
insignificant. The estimated effect of firm-level bargaining is positive also on the share of 
workforce undergoing training, but does not survive to a control for firm fixed effects. This 
apparent puzzle may be explained in terms of training deepening: the implication of a firm-
level agreement is not that firms train more workers, but that they train more the workers 
that would have undergone training anyway.  
Columns 5 and 6 offer a first exploration into the issue of whether the training 
activity is ultimately financed out of a firm’s private funds, or rather by resorting to the 
external financial resources offered by the so-called fondi interprofessionali. These are 
funds bilaterally managed by employers’ associations and trade unions. The evidence is 
mixed. It seems that firm-level bargaining does not have any impact on the training 
initiatives funded by a firm’s own funds (column 5). However, the formal consultation 
activities leading to the signing of a firm-level contract exert a positive impact on a firm’s 
ability to attract external resources via the fondi interprofessionali (the probability is raised 
by 10 to 12 p.p., see columns 6). The access to such funds to finance workplace training 
requires an agreement with workers’ representatives, something that is more likely to 
happen within the formal consultation processes leading to the signing a firm-level 
agreement. More generally, one may argue that the prevalence of collaborative and 
participative industrial relations, conducive to firm-level agreements, also represents a kind 
of environmental pre-condition for the decision to apply to, and to successful obtain, 
external funds for a firm’s training needs. If so, not only does the existence of a firm-level 
collective agreement eases the access to external funds for training; it also allows the firms 
to keep internal funds untouched in spite of the higher amount of training provided.  
The mere presence of workplace unionism, on the other hand, delivers ambiguous 
results. According to the OLS estimates, Union has a positive effect only on externally 
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funded training, but the effect is quite small (+1.5 p.p). According to the FE models the 
same variable is positively associated only to privately funded training initiatives (+6.8 
p.p.). However, this effect turns statistically insignificant as soon as, in robustness analyses, 
we focus on manufacturing firms only. None of the results shown earlier would instead be 
affected by such a qualification (see Appendix A).  
To conclude this section, we point out two caveats. First, despite our effort to 
account for a large set of control variables, including firm fixed effects, a causal 
interpretation of our estimates is unwarranted. In Anglo-Saxon settings, the literature has 
usefully exploited the kind of “natural experiments” offered by close representation 
elections (DiNardo and Lee, 2004). In this case, firms where the election to establish a 
union was lost by a few votes, may represent a credible counterfactual scenario for the 
firms that that could establish a union because the election was won by a small margin. 
Certification elections, and other natural experiments alike, are unavailable in the 
institutional settings characterizing most EU countries. Lacking any fully credible 
exogenous source of variation, our estimates should be most safely interpreted as indicating 
correlations among the variables of interest. Second, and in common with most of the 
econometric literature surveyed in section 2, the survey data used in the quantitative 
analysis offers little useful information to further dig into the many channels and processes 
at play, as discussed earlier. We believe the qualitative analysis offered in the next section 
has the potential to offer complementary insights to our quantitative findings, partly 
responding to the caveats expressed above.  
 
 
6. Empirical results: qualitative analysis 
 
The qualitative analysis investigates the social processes through which the workplace 
union (often with support by sector-wide representatives) intervenes on workplace skill 
formation issues. In spite of some constraints on trade unions’ involvement, it brings to 
light three different channels: 1) decentralized collective bargaining, 2) the collective voice 
face, and 3) what we called the watch-dog function. Through these channels, workplace 
union is found to pursue multiple goals (Table 4), part of which finds support in the 
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literature (e.g. in terms of rent-sharing). Our analysis, however, also calls for an extension 
of the interpretative hypotheses about union involvement. The achievement of the multiple 
goals illustrated below is intended to secure trade unions a role in training decisions. In the 
following, we discuss the results by quoting some of the original and most representative 
sentences from the interviews.19 
 
6.1 Constraints on the involvement of trade unions 
Our analysis shows that workers’ representatives are hardly involved in the decision-
making processes leading to the organization of training courses. This is strictly related to 
the traditional approach towards formation issues that employers, unions representatives, 
and workers still have. Specifically, we identified three main constraints: employers’ taken-
for-granted idea that skill formation is a unilateral policy, consistently with the managerial 
competence hypothesis (e.g. FitzRoy and Kraft, 1985; 1987); the understanding of training 
as a non-priority in the bargaining space by representatives of both the workers and the 
employers; blue-collar workers’ unfavorable approach to training. 
The first constraint is the belief of employers' representatives that the issues of 
workplace skills needs and training are totally unilateral. According to them, indeed, these 
issues should not be part of negotiations, whether there is support from bilateral funds or 
not. As employers’ representatives told us, skill formation is a traditionally unilateral 
policy, a company’s prerogative: 
 
[TO-1] “We think that we do not need to discuss with unions on skills needs, 
search or formation. It’s a traditionally unilateral policy: I have a need, I do 
identify it, make a plan and carry it out […]. On top of being a company’s 
management’s prerogative, things simply work this way: there’s an issue of 
timing […]. There’s never been another partner involved.” (Employers’ 
representative) 
 
[TO-2] “Companies’ duty is caring about resources, human resources in 
particular. It’s a company’s prerogative, it’s not in the bargaining space. This 
is in our experience […]. The generating moment is all on the company’s side 
[…]. The company prepares the technology, the raw materials, the markets, 
tries to understand and prepare the human resources, and it has always been a 
                                                 
19 The original take-outs in Italian are reported in Appendix B. 
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company’s matter […]. It is in everybody’s experience that work organization 
stays on this side.” (Employers’ representative) 
 
 
Workplace skill formation is understood by employers’ representatives as a 
unilateral matter, which has not to be discussed with unions for reasons related to tradition 
and to pragmatism. The pretended objective reasons are that the management knows 
business strategies; they know training needs; and they are often forced to work in a “crisis” 
mode, meaning that they have very limited time, which does not allow for collective and 
shared reflections – especially in SMEs. This is taken for granted: “Things simply work this 
way”, “It is in everybody’s experience that work organization stays on this side”. 
Second, even if training may well be an issue within collective bargaining, firm-
level agreements have other priorities, namely wages and working hours (Hyman, 2001). 
As a matter of fact, the necessity to fill a skill gap or a shortage of training generally is not 
a sufficient reason to initiate a firm-level bargaining process. “I have no idea of agreements 
exclusively dedicated to training” told us a workers' representative. Similarly, an 
employers' representative said: “I cannot remember of any example. It is not the right 
channel. Maybe because [training] is not an issue discussed in those circumstances”. This 
idea is also related to the different timing of collective bargaining and skill formation 
processes.  As an employers’ representative said: 
 
[TO-3] “Training is not really a subject of bargaining. I mean…when we talk 
of bargaining, we have in mind the one that occurs every three, four years […]. 
There are requests, a discussion and an output which is the contract […]. I 
mean, [when the necessity to fill a skill gap emerges] there’s no time to wait or 
discuss of this […]. The day we buy an accounting software, we are already 
late with training.” (Employers’ representative) 
 
While collective bargaining rounds occur every three or four years, training needs 
– once recognized – require to be satisfied as soon as possible, especially in SMEs. Indeed, 
SMEs tend to react to external events at need and do not plan training over the medium/long 
run; this also happens when the access to bilateral funds is tightly time-constrained. Unions’ 
involvement in workplace skill-formation processes is hence limited by both employers’ 
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and workers’ representatives’ understanding of training as a non-priority in the bargaining 
space. 
The third constraint on unions’ involvement is related to the representation of blue-
collar workers. Our analysis points out that, according to both the trade unionists and the 
human resource managers interviewed, they are hardly able to recognize their skill gaps, 
as the next excerpts show. To intervene more deeply on training decisions, workers’ 
representatives should be able to provide valuable information on their colleagues’ skill 
needs and on adequate training interventions. Instead, RSU/RSA are themselves workers 
who often do not possess the capacity to perform a detailed analysis of skill needs: 
 
[TO-4] “Our general problem – but for a few cases – is that we represent the 
medium-low level […]. So, let’s say that in order to work on skill formation, 
we should be able to rely upon members who are able to make an analysis and 
then a proposal. But if there is no internal debate, like someone who says: 
«Dear union, I need this, this and this»…Well, it’s hard, at least in the 
manufacture”. (Union representative)  
 
[TO-5] “It’s hard to think of the Union as of one with an upper-case U, because 
workplace unionism is made by RSU and RSA. They’re wonderful people, 
but…one is a shift worker, another is a team leader…people who work well, 
but as far as skill planning is concerned […] it’s a matter of the firm […]. Skill 
formation is so specific that is has to be done by those who manage this issue 
every day”. (Human resources manager) 
 
On the contrary, white-collar and high-skill workers hold positions closer to the 
management. Thus, they can better recognize and share their perception of skill gaps with 
those who are in charge of the company (McGuinness and Ortiz, 2016). In addition, blue-
collar workers hardly understand the value and usefulness of training, with the consequence 
that there is, as union representatives call it, resistance from the workers.  
 
[TO-6] “There’s always another side of the story then: resistance from workers, 
when they say: «My company is asking me to do training, but if afterwards I 
do not get promoted, why are they making me do it?» […] There’s resistance 
on the side of the workers.” (Union representative) 
 
[TO-7] “They are not uninterested, but less sensitive. The average worker – 
generally speaking – would like to do always his job without being demoted. 
[…] Changing one’s occupation somehow generates…some disease, and so 
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going back to a classroom or gather experience generates – how to say? – a 
kind of unease, because one feels – in particular workers employed there since 
many years – to be evaluated again, to start all over again. «Maybe the 
youngsters should do it, why me?»” (Union representative) 
 
Our interview data show that this experience is also shared by companies. Human 
resource managers describe the difficulties of involving the lower levels of workers, who 
conceive training activities as an obligation or as a moment of individual assessment, rather 
than as an opportunity increasing their human capital. The analysis thus brings to light a 
cultural constraint related to the union representation target, that is a lack of understanding 
of the value – also the economic one – that training and human capital have nowadays for 
the worker, also from an instrumental perspective of employability. 
 
6.2 Unpacking processes: decentralized collective bargaining 
Although training is not the priority to bargain over, nor it is the driving force to initiate a 
workplace agreement, it is also true that firm-level bargaining creates the chance to tackle 
skill formation issues by providing a frame for a wider dialogue. In this collaborative 
context, the issue of workplace training can more likely arise as a matter of concern 
between managers and worker’ representatives. In the following excerpt, a human 
resources manager of a large company clearly told us that firm-level bargaining favors the 
development of a constant dialogue between managers and workers’ representatives within 
which even the themes of skill formation, although not primary, can be shared: 
 
[TO-8]“In my experience, even for companies that use workplace agreements 
as innovative tools, to go beyond national agreements, the issue of reducing 
skill mismatch is not a priority in the [industrial] relations agenda. This issue 
alone is not sufficient to sign or update a workplace agreement. Workplace 
agreements are still based on work organization and – in our case – also on 
some innovative tools like welfare provisions; somehow they favor, they give 
rise to, create the context […] for the company to organize those training 
courses I was talking about”. (Human resources manager) 
 
According to the data, the mechanism is the following: at the beginning, there are 
complex claims with various themes and very long discussions with the consequence that 
the top issues (wages and working hours) are the most debated and other topics, including 
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training, are overlooked. This is especially true if it is the first agreement between the 
partners involved. If the agreement is renewed, then it may be that, in addition to wages 
and work organization, the agreement tackles the theme of workplace training: “It is the 
willingness to bargain over a comprehensive agreement that brings the discussion on 
training”. As a union representative explained:  
 
[TO-9] “We make also complex and comprehensive agreements, and indeed 
discussions last quite a lot [...]. Generally speaking, it is the willingness to 
bargain over a comprehensive agreement that brings the discussion on 
training. Training is not the leading reason. Usually, what brings a company 
to firm-level bargaining […] is either the time-schedules or performance pay. 
All the remaining issues follow. When agreements are extended or renewed, 
then one is also able to go into details. Because if our system of performance 
pay works, if our agreement on time-schedules works and the company does 
not have any particular need, then we can focus on the other issues in the next 
bargaining round.” (Union representative) 
 
Importantly, respondents understand collective bargaining as a process of 
negotiation, which involves trade-offs for both sides. Our data analysis shows that, when 
the chance to include training issues in the firm-level agreement is created, the union's main 
goal is twofold: to negotiate ex-ante a fair distribution between workers and the company 
of the returns obtained from investment in training on the one side, and to demand greater 
participation in firm's decision-making processes regarding skill formation on the other 
side. Therefore, when the agreement is renewed, and the platform includes other topics 
beyond the priority ones, the stakes for the unions are some economic components of rent-
sharing, such as salary increases and bonuses, and a greater union involvement in decision-
making processes, for example in the form of periodic meetings and information exchanges 
through which “share the path”: 
 
[TO-10] “In the platform we ask for training and for appreciation of workers’ 
multi-tasking and polyvalence, relating them also to wage increases, because 
we believe that when a worker holds higher skills, this should be recognized 
also from a pay standpoint […]. This is the challenge. We often say that our 
idea is: «Is the worker more qualified? Yes? Well, then s/he should hold a 
higher job qualification and should be paid more». This should be the rule. 
There are companies, large ones, where we went through a detailed analysis, 
and then they invested and recognized job qualifications to reward 
professionalism and skills [through] wages […]. Therefore, whenever we are 
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able to share the path, it’s already a non-negligible step towards 
participation”. (Union representative) 
 
The economic components of rent-sharing which our respondents refer to are the 
payment of wage bonuses related to training courses, and are regulated by firm-level 
agreements. Sometimes, the agreements may also contain wage claims that refrain from 
opportunistic behaviors (the hold-up problem: Card et al., 2014; Devicienti et al., 2017; 
Green and Heywood, 2011) and the appearance of the monopoly face discussed above. 
Bargaining can, for instance, set up skill-mapping systems and parameters for the 
recognition of greater remuneration for the attained professionalism (Adapt, 2015; CNEL-
Istat, 2015; Ocsel, 2015). By way of example, we show the following excerpts from two 
interviews with the human resource managers of large companies presenting best practices 
in terms of training policy and industrial relations. If in the first excerpt, the interviewee 
recounts his experience of having linked the productivity bonuses to the successful 
attendance of employees at training courses, in the second extract the interviewee tells us 
how in his company the trade union has been involved in the setting up of the tailor-made 
job description linked to salary increments, as recognized in the writing of a complex 
second level collective agreement in the 1990s, then updated over the years.  
 
[TO-11] “We need to be competitive and training is a way to be competitive 
[…]. We sometimes put it in firm agreements on productivity bonuses, thus 
workers also have an economic advantage […]. In the last few years we have 
linked the bonus of some departments to the training hours”. (Human resources 
manager) 
 
[TO-12] “Union has that document and it is called (Tfor) Technical force. It is 
a picture of the necessary professional roles to correctly cover the productive 
roles […]. The union is informed of every step of each worker within this 
training system […]. The company and the union […] set up an organizational 
chart […]. In our firm we have decided to do something different: we take a 
picture of the company, define what the company needs, we agree on what the 
numbers are, then we go on to define what these numbers of people should be 
like, such as professional content they must have, what training courses they 
must attend, and at the end of the course what salary-level they will have”. 
(Human resources manager) 
 
As stated in the last quotation, bargaining can in some cases include the involvement 
of the union in all phases of skill formation in the company. When the conditions for 
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advanced bargaining are present, as a union representative says in the following excerpt, 
trade union can obtain different degrees of participation in firm's decision-making 
processes (Bryson, 2018). This ranges from the introduction of information and 
consultation procedures, to the setting up of a system for monitoring training courses, and 
the creation of bilateral bodies with specific functions in the field of professional 
development (Adapt, 2015; CISL, 2015; CNEL-Istat, 2015).  
 
[TO-13] “Generally speaking, what can collective bargaining do? It can 
envisage participation paths, and […] can envisage a little or a lot […]. It can 
foresee training courses to analyze the production processes cross-sectionally, 
and then study the workers’ skill needs and then, say, entrust the internal skill 
formation bodies; it can make provision for a monitoring role for trade unions. 
However, we’re always talking about very advanced bargaining processes and 
industrial relations”. (Union representative) 
 
Finally, our analysis highlights the pivotal role played by the union in the processes 
of skill formation when bargaining is defensive, that is after a firm's closing or a corporate 
restructuring (Klindt, 2017; Pulignano and Stewart, 2013). According to our data, 
especially in the last years after the economic recession, trade unions - by relying on their 
knowledge of the local labor market and their bargaining capacity - have pursued the goal 
of employment protection through the promotion of employees’ training, as we read in the 
following excerpt: 
 
[TO-14] “And we signed agreements aimed at insisting that companies support 
redeployment also through retraining, also in order to manage the employment 
protection issue. Then, as unions, we did not enter into the contents of training, 
this is all up to the companies. What we said is: «You, company, make an effort, 
if you want to manage this process we are going through, to retrain the workers, 
in order to manage the employment issues at best»”. (Union representative) 
 
Specifically, unions - which according to interview data became in this case much 
more involved in human capital issues - can provide an internal intervention, that is re-
training for some employees in case of company restructuring, and an external one, that is 
outplacement agreements for redundant workers who undertake training courses. As 
explained by a union representative in the next extract, in case of company restructuring 
and defensive agreements, unions always promote the re-training of those employees who 
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may lack sufficient skills, so as to protect their employment. In case of an outplacement 
agreement, unions negotiate a financing by the company to retrain the dismissed workers. 
In the last case, the role of active labor policies and regional funds are fundamental. 
 
[TO-15] “Within restructuring processes, we can conduct an analysis with the 
management and discuss with them, in order to understand where the company 
is going. Put it simply: if the company today produces phones, and tomorrow 
is going to produce boilers, obviously we need to radically change the skills 
[…]. So we generally do this and can ask: «Which skills do you need? Do you 
have them all within the plant?» – we use this argument also to limit the layoffs 
– […] «If not, are you available» – we try it immediately – «are you available 
to start (re-)qualification processes for your employees without those skills?» 
[…] The second issue is [as follows]: we know that some workers will be laid 
off, and we can expect […] outplacement agreements, […] where an issue is 
agreeing that the company will invest 1,000, 5,000, 10,000 Euros, or whatever 
the sum, on each worker in order to fund retraining paths also through 
outplacement […]. Then we can also make agreements involving other 
institutions, the Regional Government in particular, that holds most of the 
funds for active policies”. (Union representative) 
 
In short, the data show that through collective bargaining the trade union pursues 
(at least) three goals: to negotiate ex-ante rent-sharing, to demand greater workers’ 
involvement on skill formation, and to protect the employment. 
 
 
6.3 Unpacking processes: collective voice face 
The respondents lucidly told us that industrial relations are constantly exercised, 
inside and outside the company, on a number of issues that exceed the contents written on 
“advanced” and defensive collective agreements. Unions’ collective voice function indeed 
can be performed both intra-organization and inter-organizations that is, as an employers’ 
representative told in the next quote, through both the daily relations between managers 
and workers’ representatives within the firm, and the setting up of a regional information 
system regarding skills needs and the necessary training interventions, which involves 
different stakeholders (Trampusch and Eichenberger, 2012): 
 
[TO-16] Interviewee: “The wisdom to say: «We need [skill formation] because 
trained workers are more secure workers» they [the unions] have it, but they 
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don’t bring it to the bargaining table with the firm because it’s not the right 
place”. 
Interviewer: “And which is the right one?” 
Interviewee: “Well, industrial relations are always going on, they do not exist 
only during the bargaining process, so there are moments to discuss. Then 
every single sector-level agreement includes an information system: through 
recurring meetings, and so on”. (Employers’ representative) 
 
Our analysis reveals that having repeated meetings and opportunities for sitting at a 
negotiating table, although to subscribe contents other than training, can set in motion a 
series of conditions, such as information exchanges, collaborative company climate, 
dialogue between the social partners inside and outside the company, long-term 
commitment, which favor the investment in human capital. Specifically, data show that 
unions collective voice function facilitates the recognition of skill gaps and mismatches by 
workplace unions, the firm’s access to external financial resources by Fondi 
interprofessionali, and potentially increases union’s power to contribute to the definition 
of training contents within the call system of bilateral funds. 
According to our data about large companies, where human resources management 
practices are more developed, industrial relations more advanced, and best practices in 
terms of training policy emerge, workers’ representatives can contribute to the recognition 
of skill gaps and mismatches, as well as in terms of proposals of training activities. As a 
human resources manager told us: 
 
[TO-17] “Every single month I plan a meeting with workers’ representatives, I 
do not wait for a problem to come out, we do not meet when the unions convene 
me […]. Hence, everyone has to be involved, and [together] we discuss whether 
there are problems we did not perceive and whether the workers talked to the 
unions […]. During the meetings, [workers’ representatives] can give us some 
advice: [maybe] there’s a problem with a union member and they deem we did 
not do enough, since s/he has not a good performance for instance, and say: 
«Provide her with some extra training, which is the best way to overcome 
problems positively». They also can take part into such proposals […]. So, 
about skill formation: if they detected some gap we overlooked, they tell us”. 
(Human resources manager) 
 
As we read, in order for this to happen, there must be a collaborative climate and a 
constant dialogue between managers and workers’ representatives beyond the formal 
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bargaining meetings, which, we could say, represent a kind of precondition. Moreover, 
taking also into account the results of our econometric analyses, we argue that good-quality 
industrial relations at the company level – also signaled through the presence of firm-level 
bargaining – favor the application for external training funds, especially bilateral funds 
(fondi interprofessionali). They indeed require the involvement of workers' representatives 
as far as the company’s training project needs to be shared and approved by the RSU/RSA, 
as shown for example by the next excerpts: 
 
[TO-18] “About human capital formation…yes: there can be a discussion [with 
the union] and often there’s one. There are some peer bodies, like Fondimpresa 
– which is a fund – that necessarily requires discussion, participation and co-
determination of training processes [with the union]”. (Employers 
representative) 
 
[TO-19] “You know, these ‘fondi interprofessionali’ are valued more if we also 
sign the agreements, so we sign many training agreements with the firms 
because there’s an evaluation mechanism that envisages […] the union’s 
signature, which means that there’s an agreed skill formation process. So it 
often happens…”. (Union representative) 
 
Respondents refer here to Fondimpresa, the largest bilateral fund – mainly for 
manufacturing companies, but not only – which is constituted by the Italian employers' 
federation (Confindustria) and the three largest trade unions (Cigl, Cisl, Uil). Similarly to 
the other twenty-one currently exiting funds for continuing vocational training in Italy, it 
funds training courses for workers employed in companies enrolled into the fund itself. 
However, it is not subject to firm collective agreements as it follows times and modes 
different from those of the bargaining process, as explained in the following quote by an 
employers’ representative: 
 
[TO-20] “While firm-level bargaining is a sine wave, more or less it occurs 
every three years, then waits and starts again…Well, training is a straight line, 
it may occur at any time during the company’s life […]. The bargaining 
dynamics consists of someone who makes a proposal, and somebody else who 
counteroffers or accepts […]; then [in skill formation through Fondimpresa] 
the person in charge of evaluating the training proposal is the internal workers’ 
representative, who is directly voted by the employees, while with collective 
bargaining, in nine out of ten cases – if not in 9.5 out of ten – there’s always 
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the external assistance of unions. It’s not a bargaining process as we usually 
mean it.” (Employers representative) 
 
Training financed under bilateral funds is not properly part of firm-level bargaining, 
but can flourish more smoothly in organizations where there are constant trade union 
relations. As a matter of fact, despite interview data suggest that RSU/RSA generally 
become aware of the training courses only at the last moment, leaving little room for 
discussion and negotiation, a collaborative climate between the social partners allows for 
timeliness, a crucial quality to take part into competitive calls (the so-called Avvisi) that 
bilateral funds open with tight deadlines on a variety of issues, such as competitiveness, 
technological innovation of product and/or process, and internationalization. 
Furthermore, whereas the RSU/RSA have a limited control over how bilateral funds 
work, they keep regularly in touch with external union representatives. Together with other 
stakeholders, external union representatives play an important role upstream in the decision 
process: taking advantage of the meetings related to the call system that bilateral funds use 
for training financing, they potentially accrue some power to contribute to the definition of 
training and calls’ contents. As an expert on skill mismatch and training told us: 
“Confindustria [the main employers’ representation body in the manufacturing sector] and 
the unions keep a smooth relationship, and meet here every day: all projects under bilateral 
funds about continuing vocational training are discussed”. Despite data suggest that this 
path is only at the beginning, a new role here may propel unions to coordinate within multi-
stakeholder networks crucial activities aimed at the skill development for the local labor 
market (Del Punta, 2003; Kristensen and Rocha, 2012). 
 
6.4 Unpacking processes: watchdog function 
As far as firm-specific skill formation is concerned, bilateral funds provide the unions with 
the possibility to exercise new roles, which we enclose in the term watchdog. The watchdog 
function includes trade union’s monitoring activities on the training programs carried out 
in a company, the sowing of the employability culture – also at the cost to give up to some 
direct (economic) recognition – and the promotion of wider workers’ inclusion. 
Specifically, in providing the post-training function of monitoring, unions check 
that courses have been actually delivered, that attendees are satisfied, and to which extent 
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they have understood the relevance of continuing vocational training for their 
employability. In other words, they try, not without difficulties, to tackle the (blue-collar) 
workers’ resistance we mentioned above, and to promote instead an employability culture: 
 
[TO-21] “We seldom intervene on training contents, as skills are very technical 
and company-specific, […] therefore I just care about checking that training is 
given the right relevance and that it’s not happening the opposite […]. We 
would like to reinforce the attitude for skill formation, but if participants’ 
experiences are negative, then the opposite happens, and workers just say: «No 
way, I tried once and it was a total mess, I only lost time and I got bored».” 
(Union representative) 
 
[TO-22] “In other words, it means that training courses that are not aimed at 
a higher pay, then [they are hardly welcome]…On the contrary you may say: 
«Yes, that’s also an objective, but another one is to give you skills that are 
useful to retain your current job». But this is not an easy message.” (Union 
representative) 
 
In the respondents’ view, training is strictly related to the issue of employability, 
which is seen as crucial as never before both by the entrepreneurs – because it contributes 
to organizational flexibility – and by the unions, as a more trained and functionally flexible 
worker is easier to employ and then to protect. The next extract from an interview with an 
employers’ representative is particularly clear: 
 
[TO-23] “These long-lasting crisis years prove that functional flexibility is a 
value added. And the most skilled workers are also the easiest to protect. Or 
the most employable. In this perspective, the most advanced unions and 
companies do totally agree. The union, because has a worker who is stronger 
on the labor market; the company, because has a worker who is more 
supportive to organization flexibility”. (Employers representative) 
 
Trade unions seem to care not only about employability, but also about the inclusion 
of some segments of the workforce – especially those with low qualifications – and about 
the introduction of training topics beyond those required by the law. In cases where smooth 
trade union relations create a collaborative company climate and training plans are shared 
with workers’ representatives, as shown by the next excerpts, RSU/RSA can take the 
chance to widen the audience of recipients towards the inclusion of blue-collars and low-
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skilled workers (Hoque and Bacon, 2008; Lindsay et al., 2012; Wiß, 2017). Moreover, 
training contents go beyond the compulsory and basic courses. 
 
[TO-24] “…but we should say that companies are more prone to make this kind 
of skills formation on the high levels, and not on blue-collar workers. For the 
blue-collars, they propose the compulsory courses, i.e. those on safety; while 
on the high levels it’s an issue they’d like to manage on their own, they do not 
like to talk about. That’s indeed the point: what we usually say on skills 
formation is: «If this time training is devoted to managers, next time it will be 
the other ones’ turn» […]. Companies bet on those ones. And the discussion is: 
«Let’s try to involve everyone, to prepare something that may be of interest to 
the ones we do represent the most».” (Union representative) 
 
[TO-25] “Sometimes, once a year, we get to a discussion in which the 
company, based on their own analyses, says: «We’d like to do this kind of 
training…» And the union – the RSU/RSA – in turn based on its own data: 
«No, in our view, on top of what you say, there’s also need to start courses of 
this type in that department» and so on. This is to prevent that everything boils 
down to a course about Word or Excel or English language, that are not really 
useful […]. If this path, the plans and the explanation to the workers about 
where training will intervene are shared, then it’s a good starting point”. 
(Union representative) 
 
During the periodic meetings between the RSU/RSA and company’s human 
resource managers, union representatives perform the function of watchdog to the extent 
that they claim for an inclusive logic, showing the way to be able to take part into the 
processes of skill accumulation. 
 
 
7. Interpretation and concluding remarks 
 
The literature studying the relationship between firm-level union activity, decentralized 
collective agreements and workplace training highlights the existence of many possible 
underlying channels. Some of them are expected to entail a mainly negative association 
among the variables of interest, while others are presumed to have more positive impacts. 
The sign of the overall effect cannot be established by theory alone, which also prevents 
informed policy indications to be provided. A major interest in this respect lies in assessing 
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whether the indications given by many commentators and international institutions towards 
the promotion of more decentralized industrial relations have any sound empirical basis.       
To tackle this issue, we begun by using econometric evidence drawn from a 
representative firm-level survey. Our quantitative analysis provides robust evidence that a 
positive association between workplace training, and union activity at the firm level 
actually exists and that – other things being equal – its sign is positive. This is especially 
true when union activity at the workplace is channeled through the processes leading to 
decentralized bargaining and resulting in the signing-up of a formal firm-level agreement. 
The positive effects are found when either measures of training quantity and training 
quality are used, and when the estimation methods account for firm unobserved 
heterogeneity via fixed effect models. Hence, the quantitative analysis allows us to discard 
the empirical relevance of the hold-up theory, as far as investments in firm-specific human 
capital are concerned. This result echoes the ones in Card et al. (2014) who do not report 
any evidence of hold-up in the case of physical capital accumulation for firms operating in 
the Veneto region of Italy. An interpretation of these findings is that the positive effects 
broadly consistent with the “collective voice” face of unionism tend to dominate the more 
adverse ones arising from its “monopoly face”.  
We have also argued that the quantitative analysis alone, even with relatively rich 
firm-level surveys like the one we have used, is not sufficient to make any further progress 
in disentangling among the various channels and processes at play. Using a mixed-method 
approach, where quantitative and qualitative methods are used jointly, appears as a more 
promising avenue of investigation. Hence, we proceeded with a series of semi-structured 
interviews to the key informants that are regularly engaged in firms’ training initiatives and 
industrial relations. The results of this qualitative exercise is a mix of pessimistic and more 
optimistic views on the actual relationship between workplace unionism and training.  
On the more pessimistic side, respondents pointed out that workers’ representative 
and unions do not typically have a direct role in the initiation of a firm’s training activities. 
To being with, workplace unions are not interested – at least at first – in bargaining over 
training. Their shorter-term interest lies in wages and other working conditions. Second, 
the respondents indicated that worker’s representative, and even the supporting officials of 
local unions, do not typically have the skills and competences to identify a firm’s skill 
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needs and to suggest proper training initiatives. Third, a prevalent cultural trait shared 
among the social partners is that training is essentially a firm’s prerogative of the firm and 
of its managers. According to this account, one should not expect that further 
decentralization of industrial relations can significantly contribute to raise a country’s 
accumulation of firm-specific skills.   
Despite these rather negative views, many respondents provided elements that lend 
themselves to a number of more optimistic interpretations, at least in a dynamic 
perspective. First, respondents indicated that in successive rounds of collective bargaining, 
it is more likely that training enters the “bargaining space”, a dynamic process akin to a 
“maturation effect” of collective bargaining, hitherto understated by the literature. Second, 
successive rounds of collective bargaining contribute to creating the type of collaborative 
corporate environment that often constitutes a pre-condition for investment, including 
those in human capital. Relatedly, a collaborative working environment is also conducive 
to the successful attraction of external financial resources from specialized bilateral funds. 
Third, respondents called attention to the watchdog function of workplace unions, not only 
in terms of an effective monitoring of the training plans, but also with reference to a broader 
inclusiveness of the various segments of a firm’s workforce.  
 Undoubtedly, these more favorable views regarding the relation between 
workplace unionism, collective bargaining and training are likely to refer to firms and 
contexts already characterized by frontier (or “best”) practices in advanced industrial 
relations and training initiatives. Also, many of the processes involved are dynamic in 
nature, take time, and often require cultural changes among the main actors involved, 
unions and management alike. Nevertheless, if XXI century’s unions are to become the 
“collective intelligence” of workers, able to guide them in the evaluation of the new 
industrial plans and of the trustworthiness of whom them proposes, it is important that such 
cultural changes are promptly activated. The same holds on the employers’ side. 
In turn, this calls for proper policy actions. These policies should not just aim at 
promoting more decentralization of collective bargaining; it is just as important that they 
promote higher-quality decentralized industrial relations. Even if training will not be 
initially part of the bargaining platform, more training will follow over time with the 
growing of the bargaining space and the accumulation of bargaining skills and information. 
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In this view, tax breaks for wage premiums bargained at the territorial- or firm-level – the 
real triggers of firm-level bargaining – should be extended, made less dependent to the 
contingent fiscal budget constraints, less vulnerable to political uncertainties, and more 
specifically linked to the successfully monitored training initiatives. 
 Higher quality decentralization is also sometimes equated to “organized 
decentralization”, i.e. a process where sectoral (first-level) and decentralized (second-
level) bargaining coexist, with specialized functions at the distinct levels. The optimal 
specialization of the two levels should counterbalance the need to provide basic levels of 
training to workers in the same sector, something that is more effectively done at the first-
level, with firm-specific training needs within the sector, to be achieved at the second level. 
Organized decentralization should also internalize the specific needs of small and medium 
enterprises, which are often unable to engage in workplace unionism and bargaining, on 
the one hand, and to set firm-level training initiatives. Here too there is large scope for 
proper policies, aimed at promoting firm’s networking in training initiatives and territorial, 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 2010 2015 
# Obs. Mean St. Dev. # Obs. Mean St. Dev. 
Share with DCB 4,745 0.096 0.30 4,524 0.100 0.30 
Share with Unions 4,745 0.201 0.400 4,524 0.191 0.390 
Share with any 
training 
4,745 0.440 0.50 4,524 0.58 0.49 
No. of trainees 4,746 10.67 54.96 4,511 16.01 87.15 
Share of trainees 4,756 0.23 0.34 4,524 0.39 0.42 
Total cost 4,423 4531.5 30903.2 3,759 6258.4 47308.8 
Per-employee cost 4,431 98.5 452.7 3,760 123.3 556.4 
Per-trainee cost 4,430 340.2 2281.2 3,759 308.7 1908.0 
Share using internal 
funds 
4,746 0.31 0.46 4,524 0.40 0.49 





























































No of Obs. 7797 7797 7066 7066 7790 7784 
Adj. R2 0.159 0.109 0.169 0.166 0.041 0.183 
Source: own computations on RIL data. Notes: *** = 1% significant; ** = 5% significant; * = 10% 
significant. Robust standard errors in second lines. Controls include a time-trend, managers' 
educational level, type of ownership (family-based or not), workforce composition by gender, age 
class, education, occupation (white and blue collars) and type of contract (permanent or temporary), 
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Table 4. Channels through which unions intervene on skill formation issues 
Channels  Goals  
Decentralized collective 
bargaining 
- Rent-sharing  
- Claim of greater workers’ participation 
- Internal labor market (not discussed here) 
- Employment protection 
Collective voice face 
- Recognition of skill gaps and mismatches 
- Access to financing by bilateral funds  
- New deciding role within the multi-stakeholder 
system of bilateral funds 
Watch-dog function 
- Post-training function of monitoring 
- Employability culture 








Appendix A. Additional quantitative results 
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3201 - .129 
.088*** 
(.021) 
3201 - .102 
-.005 
(.028) 
3198 - .028 
.695*** 
(.143) 
2909 - .143 
.718*** 
(.162) 




3201 - .033 
.021 
(.040) 
3201 - .055 
-.013 
(.049) 
3198 - .019 
.283 
(.297) 
2909 - .021 
.329 
(.354) 
2907 - .025 
Source: own computations on RIL data. Notes: *** = 1% significant; ** = 5% significant; * = 10% 
significant. Robust standard errors in second lines. Number of observations and adjusted R-squared 
in third lines. Controls include a time-trend, managers' educational level, type of ownership 
(family-based or not), workforce composition by gender, age class, education, occupation (white 
and blue collars) and type of contract (permanent or temporary), value added per employee, 





Appendix B. Take-outs from interviews to key informants: original Italian texts 
 
[TO-1] «Noi pensiamo di non doverci confrontare col sindacato sui fabbisogni formativi, 
la ricerca di determinate competenze o lo sviluppo. È una politica che tradizionalmente si 
fa in modo unilaterale: ho un bisogno, lo identifico, strutturo un percorso e lo faccio […]. 
Ma oltre che spettare tradizionalmente al management, è che le cose vanno così: c’è un 
problema di tempistiche. […] Non c’è mai stata un’altra parte in causa». (Employers’ 
representative) 
 
[TO-2] «La parte aziendale è la cura delle risorse, quelle umane in particolare. È una 
prerogativa tipicamente aziendale, cioè non sta nello spazio contrattuale. Questo nella 
nostra esperienza. […] Il momento genetico di questa esigenza è tutta dalla parte 
aziendale. […] L’azienda predispone tecnologie, materie prime, mercati, cerca di capire e 
forma le risorse umane, e è sempre stata una leva tipicamente e fisiologicamente aziendale. 
[…] È nell’esperienza di tutti che l’organizzazione del lavoro passa da una progettazione 
che sta di qua». (Employers’ representative) 
 
[TO-3] «La formazione non è contrattazione vera e propria. Voglio dire…quando si parla 
di contrattazione, si pensa alla contrattazione che avviene periodicamente ogni tre anni, 
ogni quattro anni. […] C’è una serie di richieste, un confronto, e un output che è il 
contratto. […] Cioè non c’è neanche il tempo per aspettare o discutere di questo. […] La 
mattina che noi acquistiamo un sistema gestionale siamo già in ritardo sulla formazione 
delle persone». (Employers’ representative) 
 
[TO-4] «Il nostro problema generale, salvo alcuni limitati casi, è che rappresentiamo il 
livello medio basso. […] Per cui diciamo che intervenire sulla formazione […] vorrebbe 
dire avere dei contatti interni in grado di fare un’analisi e fare una proposta. Ma se tu non 
hai il confronto con qualcuno interno, cioè per dire un lavoratore che dice: “Caro 
sindacato io avrei bisogno di questo, questo e questo”… Tu lì fai fatica, almeno per quanto 




[TO-5] «Io faccio fatica a pensare al Sindacato con la S maiuscola, perché il sindacato 
nella fabbrica è composta da delle RSU/RSA che sono bravissime persone ma sono persone 
che…uno fa l’operatore in turno call end, uno operatore turno a caldo, uno è un capo 
squadra…persone che insomma fanno il loro lavoro, ma nella fase di progettazione della 
formazione […] ci lavoriamo noi come azienda. […] È talmente specifica la formazione 
che deve essere fatta da persone che vivono questo argomento tutti i giorni». (Human 
resources manager) 
 
[TO-6] «Dopo c’è poi sempre un altro aspetto: la resistenza da parte dei lavoratori sul dire 
“l’azienda mi fa fare il corso di formazione, ma se dopo non mi dà la categoria perché 
cavoli lo sto a fare?” […] C’è resistenza da parte dei lavoratori». (Union representative) 
 
[TO-7] «Non c’è’ disinteresse ma sono meno sensibili. Il lavoratore medio – generalmente 
– vorrebbe fare sempre il suo mestiere e non essere demansionato. […] Il cambio di 
mansione crea in qualche modo…un po’ di disagio, quindi rimettersi in aula o fare 
esperienze crea sempre un pochino di, come dire, di disagio, perché si ha la sensazione, 
specialmente se sono lavoratori che lavorano lì da molto tempo, di essere rivalutati di 
nuovo, di dover ricominciare daccapo: “Forse è meglio che lo facciano i giovani, ma 
perché lo devo fare io?”» (Union representative) 
 
[TO-8] «Nella mia esperienza le dico, pure in una azienda che fa del contratto integrativo 
uno strumento innovativo che va oltre la piattaforma nazionale, da sola l’esigenza di 
ridurre il mismatch delle competenze non è ancora centrale nell’agenda delle relazioni. 
Da sola questa esigenza non spinge alla stipula di un contratto integrativo o 
all’adeguamento di un integrativo. Integrativo oggi si basa ancora sull’organizzazione del 
lavoro, sulla gestione – nel nostro caso – anche di strumenti innovativi come il welfare 
aziendale; e in qualche modo favorisce, cioè pone le basi, crea il contesto, […] all’interno 





[TO-9] «Facciamo anche accordi complessi e infatti la discussione dura molto. […] 
Generalmente, è l’esigenza di fare una piattaforma complessiva che porta a discutere 
anche di formazione. Essa non è diciamo la causa scatenante. Generalmente la causa 
scatenante in un’azienda […] è l’orario di lavoro o il salario aggiuntivo. Tutto il resto si 
crea attorno le prime volte. Quando la contrattazione viene reiterata o rinnovata si riesce 
anche a specificare. Perché se noi abbiamo un sistema premiante che funziona, un accordo 
sull’orario che funziona, l’azienda non ha esigenze particolari, possiamo magari dedicarci 
nell’accordo successivo di più sul punto a, b o c». (Union representative) 
 
[TO-10] «Nella piattaforma mettiamo richieste relative alla formazione professionale, alla 
valorizzazione della polifunzionalità, della polivalenza dei lavoratori, legandola anche ad 
aumenti retributivi, perché se un lavoratore o una lavoratrice sono maggiormente 
professionalizzati crediamo che vada valorizzato anche dal punto di vista economico e 
salariale. […] La sfida è proprio quella lì. Noi spesso diciamo, il nostro principio è: “Il 
lavoratore è maggiormente qualificato? Sì? Va inquadrato nel livello più elevato e va 
pagato di più”. La regoletta sarebbe quella. Ci sono aziende, grandi gruppi, dove abbiamo 
fatto percorsi di analisi dettagliata, le aziende hanno investito e abbiamo fatto 
inquadramenti professionali che premiavano la professionalità, la maggiore qualifica e 
anche il salario delle persone. […] Per cui se riusciamo a condividere il percorso è già un 
passo di partecipazione non da poco». (Union representative) 
 
[TO-11] «Dobbiamo essere competitivi e la formazione è un modo per essere competitivi. 
[…] Lo mettiamo talvolta negli accordi sui premi di produttività, così le persone hanno 
anche un vantaggio economico. […] Negli ultimi anni abbiamo agganciato il premio di 
alcuni reparti alle ore di formazione». (Human resources manager) 
 
[TO-12] «Quel documento lo ha il sindacato e si chiama (Tfor) Technical force. Si tratta 
di una fotografia dei ruoli professionali necessari per poter ricoprire correttamente i ruoli 
produttivi. […] L’organizzazione sindacale è informata di ogni passaggio che viene fatto 
nei confronti della persona all’interno di questo ambito formativo. […] Azienda e 
sindacato avevano stabilito […] un organigramma di produzione. […] Abbiamo deciso di 
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fare una cosa diversa: fotografiamo l’azienda, definiamo di che cosa ha bisogno l’azienda, 
ci mettiamo d’accordo insieme su quelli che sono i numeri, poi andiamo a definire come 
devono essere questi numeri di persone, che contenuti professionali devono avere, che 
percorsi formativi devono avere e al termine del percorso che livello avranno». (Human 
resources manager). 
 
[TO-13] «Generalmente, la contrattazione che cosa può fare? La contrattazione può 
prevedere percorsi di partecipazione, e […] può prevedere poco o tantissimo. […] Può 
prevedere percorsi di formazione che analizzano i processi produttivi trasversalmente, 
quindi poi analizzano i fabbisogni formativi dei lavoratori e poi, diciamo, incaricano gli 
enti preposti di fare la formazione all’interno; può prevedere che il sindacato entri nel 
monitoraggio della formazione. Però stiamo parlando sempre di una contrattazione e di 
una relazione industriale molto avanzata». (Union representative) 
  
[TO-14] «E abbiamo fatto degli accordi per dire alle aziende di favorire, anche per gestire 
tutta la partita occupazionale, favorire anche la ricollocazione attraverso riqualificazione. 
Poi non è che come sindacato siamo entrati nel merito di come viene fatta la 
riqualificazione e che indirizzo dà eccetera, cioè questa è tutta una partita che viene 
lasciata in mano all’azienda. Quello che abbiamo detto noi è: “Azienda impegnati, se vuoi 
gestire questa ristrutturazione impegnati anche a riqualificare le persone per tentare di 
gestire al meglio l’aspetto occupazionale”». (Union representative) 
[TO-15] «All’interno di percorsi di ristrutturazione aziendale noi possiamo studiare e 
confrontarci con la direzione e capire dove va l’azienda. Banalizzo: se un’azienda che fa 
telefoni, domani mattina fa caldaie, chiaramente dobbiamo cambiare radicalmente la 
professionalità. […] Quindi noi rincorriamo generalmente a questa cosa qua e possiamo 
dire: “Di quali professionalità nuove avete bisogno? Le avete tutte dentro?” –  Lo usiamo 
anche per limitare il licenziamento questo argomento – […] E se non le avete dentro, siete 
disposti – noi lo promuoviamo immediatamente – siete disposti a fare percorsi di 
qualificazione per i vostri dipendenti che non abbiano quelle competenze?” […] Secondo 
punto è quello di dire: sappiamo che x lavoratori vengono licenziati, e possiamo prevedere 
[…] accordi di outplacement, […] dove uno dei punti è quello di dire che l’azienda si 
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impegna a investire su cadauno lavoratore 1.000, 5.000, 10.000 euro, quello che è, quello 
che si discute...al fine di finanziare percorsi di qualificazione anche attraverso 
l’outplacement. […] E poi possiamo fare accordi che coinvolgano le istituzioni su questo, 
in particolare la regione che ha la maggior parte dei fondi per le politiche attive». (Union 
representative) 
 
[TO-16] «Intervistato: “L’attenzione di dire mi serve [la formazione] perché un lavoratore 
professionalizzato è un lavoratore più sicuro, l’attenzione a quello ce l’hanno [i sindacati] 
ma non la portano nella contrattazione aziendale perché non è il posto giusto”. 
Intervistatrice: “E quale sarebbe il canale?” 
Intervistato: “Beh, le relazioni in azienda ci sono sempre, non ci sono solo nel momento 
della contrattazione aziendale, per cui i momenti di confronto ci sono. Poi ogni CCNL 
parte con un sistema informativo: per cui attraverso incontri periodici e così via». 
(Employers’ representative) 
 
[TO-17] «Io tutti i mesi faccio una riunione sindacale, non aspetto che ci sia il problema, 
non ci incontriamo quando mi convoca il sindacato. […] Perciò tutti dobbiamo essere 
coinvolti e poi ragioniamo anche se ci sono dei problemi che noi non abbiamo percepito e 
i lavoratori si sono rivolti al sindacato. […] Durante le riunioni periodiche, (i 
rappresentanti sindacali) ci possono dare qualche consiglio: c’è un problema con una 
persona che è un loro iscritto e ritengono che non abbiamo fatto abbastanza perché non 
ha una buona prestazione ad esempio e mi dicono: “Fagli un supplemento di formazione 
che è il modo per risolvere in modo positivo i problemi”. Anche loro possono partecipare 
a queste proposte. […] Quindi sulla formazione, se ad esempio hanno rilevato che qualche 
persona ha qualche gap formativo e a noi è sfuggito ce lo propongono». (Human resources 
manager) 
 
[TO-18] «Sulla formazione del capitale umano…sì […] può esserci un confronto [con il 
sindacato] e spesso anzi c’è. Ci sono alcune entità paritetiche, tipo Fondimpresa che è un 
fondo, che richiedono necessariamente il confronto, la partecipazione e condivisione di 




[TO-19] «Lei sa che questi fondi interprofessionali acquistano valore se firmiamo anche 
noi gli accordi, per cui con le aziende firmiamo parecchi accordi di formazione perché c’è 
un meccanismo di punteggio che prevede […] la firma del sindacato, che vuol dire che è 
condiviso un processo formativo. Quindi a noi capita spesso…». (Union representative) 
 
[TO-20] «Mentre la contrattazione aziendale è una sinusoide, ogni tre anni oppure meno 
si compie, poi aspetta, poi riparte… Ecco l’aspetto della formazione professionale invece 
è orizzontale, può esserci in qualsiasi momento della vita aziendale. […] La dinamica 
contrattuale è fatta in generale da qualcuno che propone e da qualcuno che contropropone 
o accetta; […] poi [nella formazione professionale tramite Fondimpresa] il soggetto a cui 
viene sottoposto il piano formativo è la RSU interna quindi un soggetto diretta espressione 
dei lavoratori, mentre nella contrattazione in 9 casi su 10 – mi verrebbe da dire in 9,5 su 
10 –  c’è sempre l’assistenza dell’organizzazione esterna. Non è un momento contrattuale 
inteso come normalmente lo pensiamo». (Employers representative) 
 
[TO-21] «È raro che noi interveniamo nel merito perché sono competenze molto tecniche 
della azienda, […] e quindi a me interessa verificare che si continui a dare valore alla 
formazione e non si faccia il contrario .[…] Noi vorremmo rafforzare la cultura della 
formazione però se le persone vivono queste esperienze come negative, si crea una 
condizione contraria, dove le persone dicono: “No lascia perdere che ho provato una volta 
ed era una schifezza, ho solo perso tempo, mi sono annoiato”». (Union representative) 
 
[TO-22] «Cioè, vuol dire che se fanno fare i corsi di formazione che però non sono 
finalizzati a pagare di più, in sostanza…. Invece tu potresti dire: “Sì, l’obiettivo è anche 
quello, ma è anche quello appunto di darti delle competenze aggiuntive che ti possono 
essere d’aiuto per conservare il posto di lavoro che hai”. Ma questo non è proprio facile 
farlo passare come un messaggio». (Union representative) 
 
[TO-23] «Questi lunghissimi anni di crisi hanno fatto vedere che la polivalenza funzionale 
è un valore aggiunto su tutto. E il lavoratore più professionalizzato è quello che è anche 
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più difendibile. O più rispendibile. In questo, il sindacato e le aziende più evolute sono 
assolutamente in sintonia. Il sindacato perché ha un lavoratore che è più forte sul mercato 
del lavoro; l’azienda perché ha un lavoratore che accompagna meglio la flessibilità 
organizzativa». (Employers representative) 
 
[TO-24] «…però diciamo che le aziende sono più portate a orientare questo tipo di 
formazione sulle fasce…sui livelli alti, non sulla base operaia; oppure, sulla base operaia, 
propongono i corsi che sono obbligatori per legge, cioè quelli sulla sicurezza; mentre per 
i livelli più alti è un tema che vogliono un po’ gestire in proprio, cioè, sono un po’ restii a 
discuterne. Infatti quello lì è il punto: normalmente nella formazione quello che diciamo 
noi è: “Se stavolta faranno i corsi i quadri, la prossima volta lo faranno altri”. […] Le 
aziende puntano su quelli. E lì la discussone che si fa è “Cerchiamo di coinvolgere anche 
gli altri, di preparare qualcosa che abbia un interesse per i livelli che rappresentiamo di 
più”».  (Union representative) 
 
[TO-25] Talvolta si arriva a un confronto, una volta all’anno, in cui l’azienda sulla base 
di una propria analisi dice: “Vorrei fare questo tipo di formazione…” E il sindacato – le 
RSU/RSA – dicono sulla base di una loro analisi: “No, secondo noi, oltre a quello che dite 
voi ci sarebbe anche la necessità di fare corsi di questo tipo nel tal reparto”, e via dicendo. 
Questo per evitare che finisca tutto a corsi di Word, Excel e inglese che lasciano un po’ il 
tempo che trovano. […] Se c’è la condivisione di questo percorso, la condivisione dei piani 
e la spiegazione ai lavoratori su quali saranno le aree di intervento della formazione, è 






Appendix C. Definition of variables 
 




Dummy variable that equals to 1 if firms provides workplace training to 
their employees, 0 otherwise 
% trained employees Share of trained on the firms' total number of employees 
Private-funded training 
Dummy variable that equals to 1 if firms financed workplace training with 
their own funds, 0 otherwise 
Use of bilateral funds  
Dummy variable that equals to 1 if firms financed  workplace training with 
(external) bilateral funds, 0 otherwise 
Cost of training per 
employee 
Log of total amount of training costs (in Euros) per employee. The amount 
of training costs is deflated 
Cost of training per 
trained worker 
Log of total amount of training costs (in Euros) per employee. The amount 
of training costs is deflated 
Union  
Dummy variable that equals to 1 if there exists a workplace body of 
workers’ representatives (RSU/RSA) at firm level, 0 otherwise 
Firm - level bargaining 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm-level agreement has been signed, 
0 otherwise 
Other variables related to management and corporate governance 
Managers' education 
Three dummy variables that equals to 1 whether the educational level of 
the employers/managers who run the firm is:  i) tertiary; ii) upper 
secondary iii) lower secondary or elementary (0 otherwise) 
Family firm 
Dummy variable that equals to 1 if the ownership of the firm is held by a 
single family, 0 otherwise 
Other workforce characteristics 
Education 
Three variables indicating the share of employees (on the firms' total 
number of employees) with: i) tertiary  education; ii) upper secondary 
education; iii) lower secondary or elementary 
Age 
Three variables indicating the share of employees (on the firms' total 
number of employees) with:  i)  less than 40 years old; ii)  between 40 and 
49 years old; iii)  more than 49 years old 
Occupation 
Three variables indicating the share (on the firms' total number of 
employees) of: i) executives, ii) white collars and iii) blue collars  
Temporary workers  
Share of employees with a fixed-term contract (of any kind) on the firms' 
total number of employees 
Female Share of female workers on the firms' total number of employees 
Net job turnover rate 
Difference between the total hirings and total separations, on the firms' 
total number of employees 
Other firm’s characteristics 
Profitability 
Log of the total sales (in Euros) per employee. The amount of sales is 
deflated 
Innovation 
Dummy variable that equals to 1 if the firm has invested in product or 
process innovation during the three years before the survey, 0 otherwise 
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International trade  
Dummy variable that equals to 1 if the firm operates in foreign markets, 0 
otherwise 
Firm's size  Log of total number of employees  
Firms' age  Number of years during which the firm has operated  
Geography 20 dummies variables indicating the Italian Nuts 2 regions 
Sector 
10 dummies variables indicating:  electricity, gas and water distribution 
(public utilities); food, textile, tobacco, etc.; chemistry, metallurgy, etc.; 
mechanics and other manufacturing goods; construction; retail and 
wholesale, tourism, hotels and restaurants; transportation; insurance and 
financial intermediation, information and communication; other business 
services, healthcare, educational and social services; others. 
Source: RIL Data 2010-15. Note: to deflate all monetary variables we relied on sectoral deflators 
(NACE 2 digit) provided by the National Statistical Institute (ISTAT) based on industrial production 
prices (the base year is 2010). The deflators are available at: http://dati.istat.it/#. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
